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Reversed Priming Effects May Be
Driven by Misperception Rather than
Subliminal Processing
Anders Sand*
Gösta Ekmans Laboratory, Department of Psychology, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden
A new paradigm for investigating whether a cognitive process is independent of
perception was recently suggested. In the paradigm, primes are shown at an
intermediate signal strength that leads to trial-to-trial and inter-individual variability in
prime perception. Here, I used this paradigm and an objective measure of perception
to assess the influence of prime identification responses on Stroop priming. I found
that sensory states producing correct and incorrect prime identification responses were
also associated with qualitatively different priming effects. Incorrect prime identification
responses were associated with reversed priming effects but in contrast to previous
studies, I interpret this to result from the (mis-)perception of primes rather than from a
subliminal process. Furthermore, the intermediate signal strength also produced inter-
individual variability in prime perception that strongly influenced priming effects: only
participants who on average perceived the primes were Stroop primed. I discuss how
this new paradigm, with a wide range of d′ values, is more appropriate when regression
analysis on inter-individual identification performance is used to investigate perception-
dependent processing. The results of this study, in line with previous results, suggest
that drawing conclusions about subliminal processes based on data averaged over
individuals may be unwarranted.
Keywords: subliminal priming, unconscious processing, perception, stimulus strength, signal detection theory,
trial-based analysis
INTRODUCTION
A question with long-standing popularity among psychologists is to what extent our cognitive
systems process stimuli that we do not perceive.1 Answering this question may reveal both whether
and how unconscious information inﬂuences our decisions (Newell and Shanks, 2014) and help us
understand the role of consciousness (Koch, 2004). Although there are many claims of high-level
processing of unperceived stimuli, the question remains unresolved (e.g., Merikle, 2001; Erdelyi,
2004; Holender and Duscherer, 2004; Kanai et al., 2006; Van den Bussche et al., 2009; Finkbeiner
and Coltheart, 2014; Newell and Shanks, 2014).
To test whether a cognitive process is independent of perception, researchers often compare
two measures of stimulus processing at a signal intensity meant to render perception impossible.
One measure is a direct measure of stimulus perception, typically a prime identiﬁcation task
1Throughout this paper I use “perception” as synonymous with “conscious perception,” “subliminal” to refer to stimulus
intensities below the threshold of perception, and “subliminal processing” to refer to processing of a stimulus with intensity
below the threshold of perception, i.e., a process occurring in the absence of perception.
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with performance measured in terms of the signal detection
theory sensitivity measure d′ (Green and Swets, 2000; Macmillan
and Creelman, 2005). The other measure is an indirect measure
of stimulus processing, typically a priming eﬀect on reaction
times in an indirect task. If, on a mean (group) level, the direct
measure suggests that the stimulus was not perceived while the
indirect measure suggests that the stimulus inﬂuenced behavior,
this is often interpreted as suggesting that perception and the
implied cognitive process are dissociated (Reingold and Merikle,
1988).
This standard paradigm is still widely used (e.g., Finkbeiner,
2011; Muscarella et al., 2013; González-García et al., 2015;
Schoeberl et al., 2015) but has been criticized as not strongly
supporting conclusions either for or against subliminal
processing. To conclude that a cognitive process is independent
of perception, researchers must ﬁrst support the claim that the
stimulus was subliminal—not even slightly perceived—for all
participants. Researchers often try to support this claim using
a critical signal intensity that restricts the range of d′ to chance
levels and by applying a null-hypothesis signiﬁcance test to
demonstrate that mean performance was not diﬀerent from
chance. This analytical approach has been criticized because of
lack of power in the test (e.g., Rouder et al., 2007; Finkbeiner
and Coltheart, 2014), because of the possible underestimation
of d′ (e.g., Pratte and Rouder, 2009; Vermeiren and Cleeremans,
2012; Lin and Murray, 2014), and because a non-signiﬁcant
test cannot support the conclusion experimenters want to reach
(e.g., Gallistel, 2009; Dienes, 2015; Sand and Nilsson, under
review). On the other hand, to conclude that a cognitive process
is dependent on perception, experimenters must support the
claim that a lack of indirect processing was due to a lack of
perception per se and not due to an insuﬃcient signal intensity
(Lau, 2009; Van den Bussche et al., 2013). As such, it can
often be diﬃcult to know what to conclude from this standard
paradigm.
Van den Bussche et al. (2013) therefore recently suggested
a new paradigm for testing whether a cognitive process is
dependent on perception. Instead of testing mean outcomes at
a critical signal intensity used to restrict d′ to chance levels, they
used an intermediate signal intensity and a trial-based approach
to classify responses as conscious, uncertain, or unconscious
based on self-reports. This approach relies on the signal detection
theory concept that any signal intensity will generate variability in
sensory states (Green and Swets, 2000; Macmillan and Creelman,
2005) and that a stimulus that is on average diﬃcult to perceive
may sometimes be perceived and sometimes not (see also
Lutz and Thompson, 2003). Haase and Fisk (2015) empirically
supported this notion by demonstrating that diﬀerent self-
reported sensory states corresponded to diﬀerent d′ outcomes.
By comparing trials in which participants reported perceiving or
not perceiving the prime, Van den Bussche et al. (2013) were
able to investigate whether a cognitive process was dependent
on perception without proving that the stimulus was subliminal
on a mean (group) level and while keeping signal intensity
constant in both perceived and not-perceived trials. Similar trial-
based analysis has been used to investigate perception-dependent
processing in the past (e.g., Kahan, 2000; Lamy et al., 2009; Ro
et al., 2009; Goodhew et al., 2011; Haase and Fisk, 2011; Peremen
and Lamy, 2014; Hesselmann et al., 2015).
Van den Bussche et al. (2013) investigated how trial-to-trial
variability in perception inﬂuenced semantic processing (Stroop
priming), a process previously suggested to be independent
of perception (e.g., Marcel, 1983; Merikle, 2001; Kouider and
Dehaene, 2007; Huckauf et al., 2008; Costello et al., 2009; Van
den Bussche et al., 2009, 2013). In Van den Bussche et al.’s (2013)
study, participants reported their awareness of a prime word (“I
am certain that I saw the color word Red,” “I think I saw the
color word Red, but I am not certain,” and “I did not see the
color word”) and the authors found the self-reports to be strongly
associated with the size of the priming eﬀects. This ﬁnding is in
line with the results of other studies using a similar trial-based
approach based on self-reports (e.g., Lamy et al., 2009; Ro et al.,
2009). Van den Bussche et al. (2013) also reported a statistically
signiﬁcant priming eﬀect in the trials participants themselves
reported to be unconscious (“I did not see the color word”; mean
eﬀect = 33 ms, 95% CI = 0.35–65.65 ms), indicating that Stroop
priming can occur independent of perception (Van den Bussche
et al., 2013).
However, as was also discussed by Van den Bussche et al.
(2013), the validity of self-reports may be questioned (Eriksen,
1960; Cheesman and Merikle, 1984; Holender, 1986; Björkman
et al., 1993; Wiens, 2007). Although introspective judgments
of perception have face validity (Cleeremans, 2011), it is also
clear that a self-reported lack of perception may not indicate
an actual lack of perception but rather a lack of conﬁdence
(Holender, 1986; Björkman et al., 1993; Wiens, 2007). This
may be especially problematic when self-reports are used in
isolation to divide trials into conscious and unconscious bins
(Schmidt, 2015). In the absence of a consensus on how tomeasure
perception, it is therefore important to compare eﬀects based
on both types of measures. Here, the paradigm suggested by
Van den Bussche et al. (2013) was used, but I follow other
studies in dividing trials into diﬀerent sensory states based on
objective performance (e.g., Kahan, 2000; Lamy et al., 2009;
Goodhew et al., 2011). I hypothesize that an intermediate signal
strength will produce trial-to-trial variability in sensory states that
in turn will produce correct and incorrect prime identiﬁcation
responses (plus measurement error in translating the sensory
state to a response) and diﬀerent priming eﬀects. Based on
previous studies, incorrect prime identiﬁcation responses may
be associated with either no priming (Lamy et al., 2009) or even
reversed priming eﬀects (Kahan, 2000; Goodhew et al., 2011).
As participants diﬀer in sensory thresholds and thus prime
perception given a ﬁxed signal intensity (e.g., Dagenbach et al.,
1989; Greenwald et al., 1995; Albrecht and Mattler, 2012; Haase
and Fisk, 2015; Lin and Murray, 2015), I also wanted to test
how inter-individual variability in prime perception inﬂuences
priming eﬀects. A strength of the paradigm developed by Van
den Bussche et al. (2013), although not explicated by the authors,
is that a signal intensity was used that did not restrict the
range of identiﬁcation performance to chance levels but rather
allowed for natural variability between participants (in the study
by Van den Bussche et al., 2013, the mean proportion of
correct responses was 59% [chance 50%], standard deviation
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15%-points, min 27% and max 89%; personal communication).
This variability in prime perception enables regression analysis
as an approach to test whether a process is dependent on
perception, an analytical approach otherwise demonstrated to
be unreliable (Dosher, 1998; Miller, 2000; Sand and Nilsson,
under review). By allowing a natural inter-individual variability
in prime perception, Haase and Fisk (2015) recently reported
that such variability can indeed inﬂuence priming eﬀects. Here, I
investigated how inter-individual variability in prime perception
inﬂuenced priming eﬀects in both correct and incorrect prime
identiﬁcation trials.
The paradigm developed by Van den Bussche et al. (2013)
was thus used to investigate two hypotheses: (1) given a
constant signal strength, sensory states that produce correct or
incorrect prime responses should also be associated with diﬀerent
priming eﬀects, and (2) given a constant signal strength, inter-
individual variability in perception should inﬂuence priming
eﬀects. Self-reports of prime perception were also measured to
compare the present results with those of Van den Bussche
et al. (2013). The aim of the current experiment was not to
provide a perfect measure of prime perception on a trial level,
but rather to demonstrate the possibility of variable priming
eﬀects from sensory states that produce correct and incorrect
responses.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Fifty-three participants with diﬀerent backgrounds participated
in the experiment (one participant was excluded for not
following instructions). There were 32 females and 21 males,
all aged 18–28 years except for one 48-years-old participant.
All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Like
Van den Bussche et al. (2013), I piloted 21 other participants
prior to the experiment to ﬁnd inter-stimulus-intervals (ISIs)
between the prime and mask that allowed for both trial and
individual variability in perception. All participants were naïve
to the purpose of the experiment, gave informed consent and
were compensated with a cinema ticket. The research was
conducted in accordance with the principles of the regional ethics
board.
Apparatus
Stimuli were shown at a distance of 0.5 m on a View Sonic
P22f CRT monitor (1024 × 768 pixels; ViewSonic, Walnut,
CA, USA) using Presentation 16.3 software (Neurobehavioral
Systems, Berkeley, CA, USA). Viewing position and distance
were stabilized with a chinrest. Stimulus presentation was
synchronized with the screen refresh rate of 160 Hz. All stimuli
were presented at the center of the screen against dark gray
background.
Stimuli
Each experimental trial started with a central ﬁxation cross
(width, 0.6◦ visual angle) shown between 500 and 900 ms.
Following this, one of four diﬀerent words denoting color was
shown (referred to as primes; “red,” “blue,” “green,” and “yellow”2;
1◦; 6-ms duration; shown in gray font). An ISI of 12.5, 25, or
100 ms separated the prime from a following backward mask
consisting of six number signs (######; 2.8◦; 140 ms). Then a
red or blue colored square was shown (referred to as a target; 2◦;
140 ms). Finally, a central question mark (1.5◦) was shown until a
response to the target was given. A 2 × 2 grid was then displayed
showing the diﬀerent prime alternatives. Four prime words were
used to reduce the number of expected correct guesses to 25% and
thus more clearly distinguish correctly perceived from correctly
guessed trials.
Procedure
Participants were ﬁrst required to make a speeded response to
the target, categorizing it as either “red” or “blue” using the “F”
and “J” keys on the keyboard. After this, participants used the
mouse to select which prime they had seen from the displayed
grid (unspeeded four-alternative-forced-choice). After selecting
their prime response, participants had to rest their ﬁngers on the
keyboard before initiating the next trial.
There were 144 trials at an ISI of 12.5 ms and 96 trials
each at ISIs of 25 and 100 ms. As piloting had shown that the
12.5-ms ISI was diﬃcult to perceive for many participants, a
larger trial number was used for this ISI to enable trial-based
analysis. Using 144 trials in all ISIs would have increased the
experimental duration above 1 h. The 100-ms ISI was included
because previous studies have suggested that intermixing easier
ISIs may increase motivation in the prime identiﬁcation task
(Pratte and Rouder, 2009). For each ISI, 50% of the trials were
congruent. The experiment was divided into six blocks separated
by pauses between (each block consisting of 56 trials with an
equal combination of ISIs and congruent trials pseudorandomly
intermixed). After the experiment, the last 41 participants of the
experiment were asked in a questionnaire to report how often
they had perceived the primes (proportion of trials).
Participants had to dual-task in the experiment, responding
to the target and then the prime in each trial. Although dual-
tasking may have some impact on priming eﬀects, previous
studies using dual-tasking have found strong priming eﬀects
(e.g., Kahan, 2000; Lamy et al., 2009; Ro et al., 2009; Finkbeiner,
2011; Goodhew et al., 2011; Van den Bussche et al., 2013).
Dual-tasking can be diﬃcult for the participant, however, so
the experiment started with two training phases. In the ﬁrst
phase, participants only had to respond to the target color (no
prime was shown during this training session) and were trained
on the response mappings in 56 trials. Three participants were
not conﬁdent in their responses and were allowed a second
training session of 56 trials. In the second phase, participants
trained on the combined task of ﬁrst responding to the target
and then to the prime while maintaining a fast response to the
target. In this second training phase, ISIs between the prime
and mask were 61, 72, and 150 ms (38 trials with one third
allotted to each ISI and one third being congruent). During this
training phase, participants received verbal encouragement and
instructions to help them identify the primes. In the training
2The actual prime stimuli were the Swedish words “röd,” “blå,” “grön,” and “gul.”
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phases, participants also adapted to the average luminance of the
display.
RESULTS
Result Overview
Table 1 summarizes the group-level results for the diﬀerent ISIs.
Objective Perception
Mean prime identiﬁcation across all ISIs was quite high, with the
prime being correctly identiﬁed in 52% of the trials (SD = 12%-
points; chance performance would be approximately 25%). Prime
identiﬁcation performance decreased with shorter ISIs but was, as
hypothesized, quite variable at ISIs of both 12.5 and 25 ms. On a
mean level, prime identiﬁcation was above chance performance
at all ISIs (Table 1).
Because there were four prime words but only two targets,
each prime was not equally likely to be shown in each trial.
This means that participants were more likely to be correct if
they guessed ‘red’ or ‘blue’ as their prime response compared
to ‘yellow’ or ‘green.’ Control analyses were performed to test
that this did not bias participants in their prime responses. In
a ﬁrst analysis, I examined how often participants responded
that the prime was the same as the target in incongruent trials.
Responding in this manner in 25% of the trials would suggest
zero bias whereas a greater proportion would suggest bias.
The proportion on a group level was 22% of the incongruent
trials (SD = 11%-points). In a second analysis, I examined
how often the diﬀerent prime responses were used for each
prime shown. This was done in order to see if there was
a bias for picking ‘red’ or ‘blue’ (the possible target colors)
over the other options. The result of this analysis is shown
in Figure 1. As can be seen, there was no response bias for
any of the primes. I also performed these analyses separately
for participants who identiﬁed the primes better than chance
and those who did not, no diﬀerences were found. As such,
these analyses suggests little to no bias in the participants’ prime
responses.
Self-Reported Perception
Self-reports from the 41 participants who contributed with these,
indicated that they perceived few primes (mean = 34% perceived
primes, SD = 18%-points) in all trials. For reference, 29% of
FIGURE 1 | Proportion of prime responses for each of the four prime
words. The prime word is shown on the x-axis and prime responses are
illustrated as the color of the boxplots (in the same order). Mean and 95%
confidence intervals are superimposed.
the primes were shown at an ISI of 100 ms, which were clearly
visible based on objective performance. Figure 2A illustrates
the relationship between self-reports and objective performance
across all ISIs. Most, i.e., 88%, of the self-reports were below the
diagonal, indicating that participants generally reported seeing
fewer primes than their objective performance would suggest (in
line with previous literature; Cheesman and Merikle, 1984; Lamy
et al., 2009).
Stroop Priming
To analyze reaction times, all trials in which the target response
was incorrect were excluded (8.1% of all trials). Following
Van den Bussche et al. (2013), no trials were excluded based
on response time (RT), to include more trials in the trial-
based analysis. Additional analyses excluding trials slower than
two standard deviations gave similar results. Participants were
generally slower when responding to a target following an
incongruent prime than to a target following a congruent
TABLE 1 | General results on a group level.
Stroop priming (ms) Error rate (%) Prime identification (d′)
ISI (ms) Mean (SD) 95% CI Mean (SD) 95% CI Mean (SD) 95% CI
12.5 6.10 (31.56) −2.69–14.88 0.67 (3.31) −0.25–1.59 0.22 (0.27) 0.14–0.29
25 26.26 (56.74) 10.47–42.06 1.02 (2.88) 0.22–1.82 0.72 (0.59) 0.56–0.88
100 118.75 (66.90) 100.13–137.38 3.90 (3.95) 2.80–5.00 2.98 (1.67) 2.51–3.44
Across 39.21 (29.95) 30.87–47.55 5.60 (7.00) 3.65–7.55 0.89 (0.39) 0.78–0.99
Stroop priming is the median difference (in ms) between responses to targets following incongruent primes minus responses to targets following congruent primes. Error
rate is the mean difference (in %-points) between errors in responses to targets following incongruent primes minus errors in responses to targets following congruent
primes. Across is the mean across the different ISIs. SD, Standard deviation; CI, confidence interval.
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FIGURE 2 | (A) Correlation between participants’ objective prime identification performance across all ISIs and self-reported proportion of perceived primes.
Proportion correct rather than d′ is shown here for comparison with self-reports. The straight line shows the fitted regression slope. For reference, the diagonal is
shown as a dotted line and the proportion of primes is shown with an ISI of 100 ms as the horizontal dotted line. (B) Relationship between participants’ self-reported
proportion of perceived primes and Stroop priming (as z-values) across all ISIs. The straight line shows the fitted linear regression slope and the gray polygon is its
95% confidence interval. For reference, the vertical dotted line is the proportion of primes shown with an ISI of 100 ms and the horizontal dotted line is zero priming.
prime, indicating a general Stroop eﬀect (Table 1). When
the primes were clearly seen (at 100-ms ISI), the Stroop
eﬀect was robust for almost all participants (62% had priming
eﬀects greater than 100 ms); the Stroop eﬀect decreased at
shorter ISIs. Two prime words (‘red’ and ‘blue’) were in
conﬂict with a target response and the other two prime
words (‘yellow’ and ‘green’) were not. A control analysis
suggested that priming eﬀects did not diﬀer between conﬂicting
and non-conﬂicting primes. Priming for conﬂicting primes
across all ISIs was 44.20 ms (95% CI = 31.63–56.77 ms)
and for non-conﬂicting primes 38.74 ms (95% CI = 30.35–
47.12 ms).
Error Analyses
For comparison with the study by Van den Bussche et al. (2013)
error rates for the diﬀerent ISI were also analyzed. Error rates
followed the same pattern as RT eﬀects for the diﬀerent ISIs
(Table 1). No trial-based analysis on Error rates was performed.
Trial-to-Trial Variability in Prime
Perception
Our ﬁrst hypothesis was that trial-to-trial variability in sensory
state should inﬂuence priming eﬀects. To test this, trials in
the 12.5 and 25 ms ISI condition were divided according to
whether or not the prime was correctly identiﬁed (71% of
participants correctly identiﬁed over 90% of primes at 100-
ms ISI, making similar analyses for that ISI less meaningful).
This division led to a variable number of trials per condition
for each participant; on a mean level, 28 trials (SD = 9)
were included in each condition. Previous experiments have
used diﬀerent arbitrary cutoﬀs to exclude participants, for
example, excluding participants with fewer than 4 or 15 trials
in each condition (Haase and Fisk, 2011; Van den Bussche
et al., 2013). However, excluding participants based on the
number of correct or incorrect trials may introduce data
interpretation problems (e.g., regression to the mean; Shanks
and Berry, 2012; Sand and Nilsson, under review), so all
participants were included in all analyses here. Additional
analyses excluding participants based on diﬀerent cutoﬀs gave
similar results.
Table 2 reports the mean of median RTs for correct and
incorrect prime identiﬁcation responses for the 12.5- and 25-ms
ISIs. In line with our hypothesis and several previous studies,
trial variability in prime perception did inﬂuence priming eﬀects.
On a group level, participants had quite large congruency
eﬀects at both 12.5- and 25-ms ISIs in the trials with correct
prime identiﬁcation responses. In comparison, participants had
reversed congruency eﬀects at both 12.5- and 25-ms ISIs in
the trials with incorrect prime identiﬁcation responses. In
the omnibus ANOVA with the factors prime response, prime
TABLE 2 | Priming for correct and incorrect responses.
Prime response ISI Congruent, mean (SD) Incongruent, mean (SD) Congruency effect mean (95% CI)
Correct 12.5 ms 504.83 (142.43) 543.23 (211.61) 38.40 (2.68–74.13)
25 ms 517.41 (175.47) 576.74 (209.14) 59.34 (34.60–84.07)
Incorrect 12.5 ms 524.69 (164.18) 515.13 (153.31) -9.56 (-19.04– -0.09)
25 ms 565.50 (229.61) 544.62 (214.86) -20.88 (-44.12–2.37)
Mean of the median RTs (in ms) as a function of prime identification response (correct and incorrect) and ISI for congruent and incongruent trials. Congruency effect is the
median difference (in ms) between congruent and incongruent primes. SD, Standard deviation; CI, confidence interval.
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identiﬁcation response, and ISI, the interaction between prime
response and congruency was signiﬁcant, i.e., F1,51 = 14.73,
p < 0.001. The other signiﬁcant eﬀects were the main eﬀect of
congruency (F1,51 = 14.04, p < 0.001) and ISI (F1,51 = 10.10,
p = 0.003). No other eﬀects were statistically signiﬁcant.
Inter-Individual Variability in Prime
Perception
Our second hypothesis was that inter-individual variability in
perception should inﬂuence priming eﬀects. Diﬀerent regression
analyses were therefore performed in which prime perception
was used as the regressor and priming eﬀects as the outcome
variable. A correlation between the two variables would suggest
that perception inﬂuence priming eﬀects and a statistically
signiﬁcant intercept would suggest that priming occurred when
d′ was at zero (i.e., priming was subliminal; Greenwald et al.,
1995). For the regression analyses, before calculating median RTs,
the RTs were transformed to z-values to decrease between-subject
variability.
First, I tested how the self-reported proportion of perceived
primes was related to Stroop priming for the 41 participants
who contributed with self-reports. Figure 2B illustrates this
relationship. As the self-reported proportion of perceived primes
wasmeasured across ISIs, priming eﬀects across ISIs were entered
into this regression. The regression result suggested only a weak
relationship between self-reports and priming (slope = 0.16, 95%
CI = −0.05–0.37, R2 = 0.06), in line with previous reports (e.g.,
Cheesman and Merikle, 1984).
Next, I tested how inter-individual variability in d′ was related
to Stroop priming at 12.5- and 25-ms ISIs (across correct
and incorrect prime responses). As mentioned above, inter-
individual variability in prime perception was highly variable
at both 12.5-and 25-ms ISIs (Table 1), with 60 and 31%
of participants performing at levels that could be expected
by chance (95% quantile of binomial distribution). Figure 3
illustrates these relationships and Table 3 summarizes the
regression models. The regression results indicated a strong,
positive relationship between d′ and priming at the 25-ms
ISI and a weaker, positive linear relationship at the 12.5-ms
ISI. In general, robust priming eﬀects were evident only for
participants performing better than chance. The regression
results did not suggest subliminal priming at either ISI
(intercepts did not diﬀer statistically signiﬁcantly from zero).
As such, at both an on average very-diﬃcult-to-identify signal
intensity and an on average less-diﬃcult-to-identify signal
intensity, individual variability in prime perception inﬂuenced
priming eﬀects and there was no indication of subliminal
priming.
Finally, I tested how inter-individual variability in d′ was
related to stroop priming for correct and incorrect prime
identiﬁcation responses at the two ISIs. Figure 4 illustrates
the relationship for each of these four conditions and
Table 3 summarizes the regression models. For correct prime
identiﬁcation responses, the regression results indicated a strong,
positive relationship between d′ and priming eﬀects at both
ISIs. For incorrect prime identiﬁcation responses, the regression
results indicated a negative relationship between d′ and priming
eﬀects at both ISIs. None of the regression models suggested any
subliminal priming. Additional analyses excluding participants
TABLE 3 | Influence of individual variability on priming.
Prime
response
ISI Intercept (95% CI) Slope (95% CI) R2
Across 12.5 ms -0.01 (-0.05–0.03) 0.12 (0.01–0.23) 0.08
25 ms -0.01 (-0.10–0.08) 0.20 (0.11–0.30) 0.26
Correct 12.5 ms -0.01 (-0.14–0.12) 0.63 (0.25–1.01) 0.18
25 ms 0.04 (-0.09–0.18) 0.34 (0.19–0.49) 0.30
Incorrect 12.5 ms -0.01 (-0.06–0.04) -0.15 (-0.30– -0.01) 0.08
25 ms 0.04 (-0.09–0.17) -0.17 (-0.31– -0.03) 0.11
Regression models when Stroop priming (as z-value) was used as the outcome
variable and prime identification (d′ ) as the regressor. Across are all trials for
that ISI, collapsed across correct and incorrect prime identification response. CI,
confidence interval.
FIGURE 3 | Relationship between d′ and Stroop priming (as z-values) for the 12.5-ms (A) and 25-ms ISIs (B). In both figures, the straight line shows the
fitted linear regression slope and the gray polygon is its 95% confidence interval. Note the difference in x-axis between the two figures. For reference, the vertical
dotted lines show chance performance and the 95% performance levels based on the binomial distribution.
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FIGURE 4 | Relationship between d′ and Stroop priming (as z-values) for correct (A,B) and incorrect (C,D) prime identification responses for the
12.5-ms (A,C) and 25-ms ISIs (B,D). In the upper panels, priming is calculated as correct incongruent – correct congruent, and in the lower panels as incorrect
incongruent – incorrect congruent. In all panels, the straight line shows the fitted linear regression slope and the gray polygon is its 95% confidence interval. Note the
difference in x-axis between the left and right panels. For reference, the vertical dotted lines show chance performance and the 95% performance levels based on
the binomial distribution.
with absolute priming eﬀects larger than a z-value of one gave
similar results for all regression models.
DISCUSSION
With regard to the ﬁrst hypothesis, I found trial-to-trial variability
in perception to be strongly related to the priming eﬀects of a
diﬃcult-to-perceive stimulus (Table 2), a ﬁnding in line with
several previous studies (e.g., Kahan, 2000; Lamy et al., 2009;
Ro et al., 2009; Goodhew et al., 2011; Van den Bussche et al.,
2013). However, here priming diﬀered qualitatively depending
on the prime responses: correct prime identiﬁcation responses
were generally associated with Stroop priming whereas incorrect
prime identiﬁcation responses were generally associated with
reversed priming eﬀects (Figure 4). My interpretation (in line
with Lutz and Thompson, 2003; Haase and Fisk, 2015) is that
the signal strengths used here produced diﬀerent sensory states,
which in turn led to correct or incorrect prime responses and to
qualitatively diﬀerent priming eﬀects.
Reversed priming eﬀects for incorrect prime identiﬁcation
responses have been reported previously (e.g., Kahan, 2000;
Goodhew et al., 2011). Previous studies proposed subliminal
processing to account for the reversed priming eﬀects:
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interpreting incorrect responses as indexing non-perceived
stimuli and interpreting reversed priming as resulting from
subliminal processing. Goodhew et al. (2011), for example,
interpreted reversed priming as an eﬀect of suppressing the
response associated with the non-perceived stimulus, which in
turn facilitates the opposite response (a negativity compatibility
eﬀect; Eimer and Schlaghecken, 1998). However, the present
data do not indicate that the reversed priming (or the standard
priming) was independent of perception, but rather that only
participants who on average perceived the primes displayed
reversed priming (Figures 4C,D). In contrast, I propose an
explanation that does not require subliminal processing:
incorrect prime identiﬁcation responses may have indexed
misperceived primes for participants who on average perceived
the primes (they truly misperceived, e.g., “red” as “blue”). My
interpretation of the reversed priming eﬀect is that participants
were primed by what they (mis-)perceived and not by subliminal
processing of what was shown on the screen. That is, the
misperception of the word ‘red’ had a tendency to prime the
color red, even if the prime word ‘blue’ was actually shown on the
screen. This explanation is consistent with the partial awareness
hypothesis about consciousness (Kouider et al., 2010) and
Kouider and Dupoux’s (2004) ﬁnding that partial awareness can
drive priming eﬀects. This interpretation can also be applied to
previous studies in which (some) participants performed above
chance (e.g., Kahan, 2000; Goodhew et al., 2011). Participants
in the study by Goodhew et al. (2011), for example, produced
correct prime identiﬁcation responses in 72% of the trials (chance
50%) and thus may have in some of the incorrect prime response
trials misperceived rather than not perceived the prime. Future
studies that combine objective and subjective measures of prime
perception in each trial may be able to lend support to one of
these explanations.
With regard to the second hypothesis, inter-individual
variability in prime perception strongly inﬂuenced the priming
eﬀects of a diﬃcult-to-perceive stimulus (Figures 3 and 4).
This indicates that participants who generally perceived the
primes (based on d′) were primed by what they perceived
or misperceived, whereas participants who generally did not
perceive the primes were neither stroop or reversed primed by
what little information they extracted from the primes. This
ﬁnding is in line with the reports of Haase and Fisk (2015),
who also used a stimulus setting that allowed for individual
variability in prime perception but is in contrast with other
reports that did not (e.g., Greenwald et al., 1995; Fisk and
Haase, 2011; Schoeberl et al., 2015). Fisk and Haase (2011)
interpreted their lack of a correlation between prime perception
and priming as due to variable and small eﬀect sizes, an
explanation I agree with. Using regression analysis to investigate
whether a process is independent of consciousness has previously
been criticized as measurement error, and a restricted range of
prime identiﬁcation performance makes the approach unreliable
(Dosher, 1998; Miller, 2000; Sand and Nilsson, under review).
In the paradigm used here, in comparison, participants’ d′ was
not restricted to chance-level performance but rather allowed
to vary naturally (with a variability similar in size to previous
reports; Dagenbach et al., 1989; Albrecht and Mattler, 2012; Van
den Bussche et al., 2013; Haase and Fisk, 2015; Lin and Murray,
2015), which increases the chances of ﬁnding a correlation
between prime perception and priming. Future studies that use
a regression approach to test whether a process is independent
of consciousness should therefore use a signal strength that gives
rise to variability in prime identiﬁcation performance.
Using an objective measure of perception I found no
indication of subliminal Stroop priming (Table 3). This is in
conﬂict with the result of Van den Bussche et al. (2013), who
used a similar paradigm (see below for a discussion about
diﬀerences in experimental parameters), but a subjective measure
of perception and who reported subliminal Stroop priming.
This diﬀerence may simply stem from the well-known fact
that subjective measures are less strict than objective measures
(Eriksen, 1960; Cheesman and Merikle, 1984; Holender, 1986;
Björkman et al., 1993; Wiens, 2007). In a study by Lamy et al.
(2009), for example, participants performed 59% correctly on
prime identiﬁcation (chance performance 25%) in the trials
where they rated themselves as unaware. Participants in the
present study also reported perceiving fewer primes than their
objective performance would suggest (Figure 2A). Furthermore,
in line with previous reports (e.g., Cheesman and Merikle,
1984), there was no strong relationship between the self-reported
proportion of perceived primes and priming eﬀects (Figure 2B).
If I extrapolate from our self-report data, many trials at the
12.5- and 25-ms ISIs might have been unconscious based on
self-reports and, in that sense, have given rise to unconscious
processing.
Furthermore, the present data are also in conﬂict with several
studies that used an objective measure of perception and that
did report subliminal semantic priming (e.g., Finkbeiner, 2011;
Muscarella et al., 2013). The lack of support for subliminal
priming in the present study may be explained by the paradigm
used. First, a lack of subliminal priming might generally stem
from a too weak signal strength (as discussed above and in
Van den Bussche et al., 2013). There are two arguments against
this explanation in the present study: (i) In comparison to
previous studies that have generally used signal strengths that
were subliminal for most or all participants, the intermediate
signal strength used here was supraliminal for many participants.
As this study used a stronger signal strength than many
previous studies, there are no a priori reasons to assume that
there would be no subliminal priming. (ii) The prime did
elicit strong priming when it was clearly perceived (100-ms
ISI) and at both 12.5- and 25-ms ISI elicited priming for
participants who did perceive the prime (Figure 3). As such,
there were general priming eﬀects which were not evident only
for subliminal participants. Second, as discussed above, the
intermediate signal strength used here led to a wide range of
d′ values, which is necessary when using regression analysis
to evaluate subliminal priming. Previous studies that have
restricted the range of d′ values may thus have overestimated
subliminal eﬀects (Dosher, 1998; Miller, 2000; Sand and Nilsson,
under review). Third, it might be that the stimuli used
here allowed for better estimation of prime perception, d′.
In previous studies (e.g., Finkbeiner, 2011; Muscarella et al.,
2013), the prime and target have been perceptually similar
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(i.e., both words) so the target could interfere with the prime
response, which would lead to underestimated prime perception,
d′ (Vermeiren and Cleeremans, 2012). In contrast, in the current
experiment, primes and targets were highly dissimilar (i.e., a word
and colored rectangle); as discussed by Van den Bussche et al.
(2013), this makes it easier for participants to judge whether
or not they perceived the prime. Future studies should more
thoroughly investigate the possibility of the underestimation of
d′ based on prime target similarity.
The present data do not support subliminal semantic priming
but is not inconsistent with the existence of subliminal semantic
priming as an actual phenomenon. A single study cannot settle
whether or not subliminal semantic priming is possible; doing
that would require an overall assessment of the literature. It
is important that such an assessment include both studies that
ﬁnd subliminal eﬀects and studies that do not, as including only
studies with positive results overestimates eﬀect sizes (i.e., ﬁle
drawer bias). This is especially important in this topic as many
studies report small eﬀect sizes for subliminal priming (Van den
Bussche et al., 2009, 2013; Fisk and Haase, 2011; Haase and Fisk,
2011).
CONCLUSION
I conclude that, at speciﬁc ISIs, both trial-to-trial and inter-
individual variability in prime perception strongly inﬂuence
priming eﬀects even when signal strength is constant. This
implies that priming eﬀects measured as means across trials may
arise from trials with varying degrees of perception (Van den
Bussche et al., 2013; Haase and Fisk, 2015) and that priming
eﬀects measured as means across participants may arise from
participants’ having varying degrees of perception (Haase and
Fisk, 2015). I therefore agree with Haase and Fisk (2015) that,
in the context of subliminal processing, drawing conclusions
based on data averaged across trials and participants may
be unwarranted as the average may be based on trials and
participants with various levels of prime perception.
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